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Abstract—  A lack of awareness surrounding secure online 
behaviour can lead to end-users, and their personal details 
becoming vulnerable to compromise.  This paper describes an 
ongoing research project in the field of usable security, 
examining the relationship between end-user-security behaviour, 
and the use of affective feedback to educate end-users.   Part of 
the aforementioned research project considers the link between 
categorical information users reveal about themselves online, and 
the information users believe, or report that they have revealed 
online. The experimental results confirm a disparity between 
information revealed, and what users think they have revealed, 
highlighting a deficit in security awareness.  Results gained in 
relation to the affective feedback delivered are mixed, indicating 
limited short-term impact.  Future work seeks to perform a long-
term study, with the view that positive behavioural changes may 
be reflected in the results as end-users become more 
knowledgeable about security awareness. 
Keywords— End-user security behaviour; usable security; 
affective feedback; user monitoring techniques; user feedback; 
security awareness; human factors of cybersecurity 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Risky security behaviour displayed by end-users has the 
potential to leave devices vulnerable to compromise [1].  
Despite the availability of security tools such as firewalls and 
virus scanners, designed to aid users in defending themselves 
against online threats, these tools cannot stop users engaging in 
risky behaviour in the context of a browser-based environment. 
This indicates a need to assess the current behaviour of end-
users, and to educate them regarding the security implications 
of their actions online.  Previous research into educational tools 
suggest the use of affective feedback as a possible method to 
utilise in a browser-based environment [2][3][4]. 
As part of a research project, a prototype Firefox extension 
named Spengler-Zuul was developed, monitoring user actions, 
and employing the use of affective feedback as a potential 
method of user education.  This paper outlines a section of a 
research project whereby a series of experiments have been 
conducted to gauge how behaviour logged by the 
aforementioned tool (categorical information) compares to 
behaviour reported in follow-up questionnaires with the users 
(reported information).  Providing a comparison highlights 
levels of security awareness in end-users, and aids in 
demonstrating the potential role affective feedback can have in 
security education. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section will outline risky security behaviours users 
may encounter when browsing the web.  It discusses studies 
covering methods of measuring risk perception.  Owing to the 
reliance on the internet, several pieces of research have posited 
the need to educate end-users regarding security behaviour, 
highlighting areas in which they may be vulnerable online.  A 
number of existing tools are reviewed, prior to a discussion of 
the role of affective feedback in an educational environment.  
A novel approach utilising a combined affective feedback and 
monitoring solution is described, before the disparity between 
categorical user behaviour versus reported user behaviour is 
explored. 
A. Risky security behaviour 
What constitutes risky behaviour is not necessarily obvious 
to all end-users and therefore, it can be difficult to recognise. 
Examples of such behaviour can include: interacting with a 
website containing coding vulnerabilities [5], downloading 
data from unsafe websites [6] or, creating weak 
passwords/sharing passwords with colleagues [7][8]. 
A number of studies have been conducted, in an attempt to 
define and categorise risky security behaviour. In 2012, a 
taxonomy was developed by Padayachee [9] to categorise 
compliant security behaviours and investigated if users had a 
predisposition to adhering to security behaviour. The results of 
the research highlighted elements which may influence security 
behaviours in users e.g. extrinsic motivation, identification, 
awareness and organisational commitment. 
In 2005, Stanton et al [7] conducted interviews with IT and 
security experts, in addition to a study involving end-users in 
the US, across a range of professions. The findings produced a 
taxonomy consisting of six identified risky behaviours: 
intentional destruction, detrimental misuse, dangerous 
tinkering, naïve mistakes, aware assurance and basic hygiene. 
Milne et al. [10] investigated risky behaviours in relation to 
self-efficacy. Participants were asked via a survey if they had 
engaged in specific risky behaviours online. These suggestions 
were drawn from previous research into risky behaviours 
[11][12].  The paper concludes different types of behaviour are 
exhibited online depending on the demographic and the self-
efficacy of the end-user. 
Behaviours users were asked about included the use of 
private email addresses to register for contests on websites, the 
use of dictionary passwords, and accepting strangers on social 
networking sites. Allowing their computer to save passwords 
was the most common risky behaviour participants admitted to 
(56%). 
A lack of perception regarding online security risks can 
leave users, and their devices vulnerable to compromise. 
B. Measuring perception of risk 
Over the years, a variety of techniques have been utilised in 
an attempt to measure the perception of risk which the end-user 
possesses.  Hill and Donaldson proposed a methodology 
integrating models of behaviour and perception [13]. The 
research examined the perception of system security the system 
administrator possessed.  This created a trust model, engaging 
system administrators, and reducing the threat from malicious 
software. By quantifying the risk of threats, a triage system was 
developed to deal with issues. 
In a different scenario, Ur et al. [14] investigated the 
correlation between users’ perceptions of password strengths 
and their actual strength on smartphones. The research 
employed the use of an online study to measure users thoughts 
on password strength and memorability, and their 
understanding of potential attacks. This data was compared 
against to users’ perceptions regarding how passwords would 
fare against password cracking attacks. Comparing the data, 
allowed for the perception of risky behaviours to be 
determined. 
Ng, et al. [15] devised a health belief analogy when 
explaining the perception of risk in terms of cyber security. 
Experiments were conducted with an example based upon 
email attachments. It was concluded that users’ security 
behaviour could be determined via perceived susceptibility, 
perceived benefits, and self-efficacy. 
San-José and Rodriguez [16] measured perception of risk 
using a multimodal approach.  In the study, an antivirus 
program was installed in 3000 households with internet 
connected PCs.  These machines were scanned for viruses on a 
monthly basis. The software was supplemented by quarterly 
questionnaires, therefore scan results could be compared 
against perception of risk information gathered from the 
questionnaires.  Results showed a false sense of security was 
created by the antivirus software, and users were unaware of 
the seriousness of risks. 
C. Education and awareness of  risky security behaviours 
A variety of tools have been developed to address differing 
aspects of risky security behaviours, and these are outlined in 
this section. 
One such example is the password strength meters used in 
research by Ur et al. [17].  These meters were placed next to 
password fields and improved the security and usability of 
passwords.  The tool was deemed to be a useful aid in 
password creation with participants noting that use of words 
such as “weak” encouraged them into creating a stronger 
password.  However, there were potential issues with retention, 
and 38% of participants admitted to writing down their 
password from the previous day. 
Other research has explored the education of users with 
regards to phishing attempts.  Such tools have included Anti-
Phishing Phil by Sheng et. al [18] which attempt to gamify the 
subject. After playing the game, 41% of participants viewed 
the URL of the web page, checking if it was a genuine site. 
Results showed that some participants became overly cautious, 
and a number of false positives were produced.   
Kumaraguru et. al [19] developed a phishing training tool, 
PhishGuru.  This was developed to discourage people from 
revealing information in a phishing attempt.  A cartoon 
message is presented if a user clicks on a link in a suspicious 
email, whereby they are warned about the dangers of phishing.  
A short-term study was conducted, and it was found that the 
cartoon message proved to be effective: participants retained 
the information after 28 days. 
A newer tool, NoPhish has been developed as an Android 
application.  The tool seeks to provide education about 
phishing attempts via mobile devices [20].  The game features 
multiple levels and users are presented with a URL.  They are 
asked to determine if it is a legitimate link, or a phishing 
attempt. After playing the game, participants gave significantly 
more correct answers when asked about phishing.  A longer-
term study showed participants still performed well however, 
their overall performance decreased. 
Information that allows phishing emails to be targeted 
towards specific users can come from revealing too much 
information online. A proposed series of nutrition labels for 
online privacy have been designed in an effort to reduce risky 
behaviour [21].  Labels seek to present the information in an 
easily readable format, aiding users to understand privacy 
policies online.  Results from a small study found that visually, 
the labels were more interesting to read than a traditional 
security policy and presented an easier way for users to find 
information. 
A Firefox extension developed by Maurer [22] provides 
alert dialogs when users are entering sensitive data e.g. credit 
card information. By providing large JavaScript warnings, the 
extension seeks to raise security awareness.  It was noted that 
the use of certain colours made users feel more secure. 
Volkamer et al. developed an add-on for Firefox called 
PassSec.  This extension attempted to help users detect 
websites which provided insecure environments for entering a 
password [23]. The extension significantly reduced the number 
of insecure logins, and therefore raised security awareness. 
The tools discussed in this section span a number of years, 
and some of the research may seem outdated.  However, the 
range, and age of the research tools developed indicates there is 
still a problem with effectively educating users regarding 
security awareness.  This suggests a different approach is 
required for user education: the use of affective feedback is a 
potential approach. 
D. Affective feedback and risky behaviours 
Affective feedback is defined as “the process of using 
technology to help people achieve and maintain specific 
internal states” [2] i.e. using signals to alter user behaviour. 
Previous research has indicated affective feedback may serve 
as a successful method of educating users about risky security 
behaviour [2][3][4]. Users’ attitudes regarding risky security 
behaviour must be modified in a bid to keep them safer online. 
Thus, by influencing end-users via affective feedback it may be 
possible to positively impact upon the security awareness of 
the end-user. 
Virtual human characters, avatars, and textual content [24] 
and the use of colour and sound [2] have been used to influence 
state.  Avatars provide affective feedback and have been seen 
to be beneficial in educational environments [2][3][4]. Textual 
information and the use of specific words has the potential to 
alter a user's state/behaviour e.g. a password described as 
“weak” can encourage them to create a stronger password [17]. 
Colour is also often utilised, with green or blue used to imply a 
positive occurrence, with red indicating a negative outcome 
[17]. 
To further the argument for use of affective feedback 
Wixon [25] discusses its benefits but also calls for more studies 
into the role of affective computing, placing emphasis on the 
need for empirical data. This is an argument also put forward 
by Beale and Creed [26] in their overview of emotional 
simulations.  Affective feedback has the potential to be utilised 
in the field of security education, thus the application of such a 
mechanism in this research project. 
Research conducted in the following section seeks to utilise 
an affective approach, deploying the use of a monitoring 
solution with an integrated affective feedback delivery system, 
in an attempt to improve end-user security awareness. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Prototypes developed 
A XUL-based Firefox extension was developed for the 
research project, named Spengler-Zuul [27].  This incorporated 
a monitoring solution capable of detecting potential security 
risks such as if a page contains malicious links, or a password 
entered is too short.  These risky behaviours were drawn from 
previous research [10][11][12][28] and were chosen as they 
could apply to the context of a browser-based environment.  
When the user interacts with the browser, information gathered 
is encrypted, and processed on the server.  As an example, 
processing the information on a server allows the URL of a 
website to be compared against a database of known malicious 
sites [29].  Detection of a malicious site triggers the affective 
feedback mechanism, delivering information to the end-user.  
A unique log file is generated for each browser session, and 
records risky security behaviour triggers e.g. if a user visited a 
malicious site. 
Three methods of affective feedback were chosen: colours, 
avatars and text. Previous research has indicated there are a 
number of types of affective feedback which could be utilised 
within the web browser window, to help guide users into 
making more appropriate security decisions.  Depending on the 
actions of the user, they may be offered positive advice because 
of their behaviour, negative advice, or a mixture of both 
positive and negative. 
The sentences contained in the Spengler-Zuul extension 
came from text in an affective word list named AFINN [30].  
The avatars were chosen in relation to Ekman’s six basic 
emotions [31].  Specifically, the happy and sad avatars used in 
this research project were drawn from work conducted by the 
Swiss Center for Affective Sciences [32].  Finally, colours used 
were chosen due to their usage in previous research projects 
[17][2].  The final colours chosen were: red (#CF4250), yellow 
(#EBA560), and green (#78BF60), producing a traffic-light 
system. 
Multiple versions of the Spengler-Zuul extension were 
developed, allowing differing combinations of affective 
feedback to be tested against a control environment: 
• Spengler-Zuul (none)- monitors users, no on-
screen feedback. 
• Spengler-Zuul (text)- monitors users, displays 
text-based affective feedback. 
• Spengler-Zuul (text, avatar)- monitors users and 
displays text-based affective feedback, and an 
avatar 
• Spengler-Zuul (text, colour)- monitors users and 
displays text-based affective feedback, and colour 
• Spengler-Zuul (text, colour, avatar)- monitors 
users and displays text-based affective feedback, 
and colour. Additionally, an avatar is situated in 
the bottom right of the screen (Fig 1). 
 
 
Fig 1. Screenshot of the Spengler-Zuul (text and colour and avatar) extension 
 
B. Experimental phase 
During the experimental process, participants were initially 
given an “Information For Participants” handout, noting that 
the experiment was testing a Firefox extension.  Security 
awareness and behaviour were not mentioned, in relation to the 
experiments, in an effort to eliminate bias.  Participants were 
then given a random USB stick, labelled with a number from 1-
5 and each USB stick contained a portable version of the 
Firefox browser, with a version of the monitoring 
solution/affective feedback mechanism add-on pre-installed 
(Table 1). After signing the consent form, participants were 
asked to work their way through an instruction sheet, visiting 
specific websites.  
Table 1. Different versions of feedback included in each experiment. 
 
USB Group Feedback type Participants 
(n) 
1 Control 12 
2 Text 13 
3 Text, avatar 16 
4 Text, colour 14 
5 Text, colour, avatar 17 
 
Participants were asked to visit a number of predefined 
sites, some with false positives to trigger appropriate feedback 
on-screen e.g. fake malicious links to trigger warnings. During 
the experimental process, participants were also asked to 
complete a web form, asking them personal information such 
as hobbies.  Completing this form was entirely optional 
however, revealing such information could have been deemed 
a risky security behaviour.   
On completion of the computer-based part of the 
experiment, participants were asked to complete a paper-based 
questionnaire regarding how well they thought they responded 
to any feedback shown on-screen. In the background, the users’ 
actions on the computer-based part of the experiment were 
logged, meaning the information provided in the questionnaire 
can be corroborated against the information in the unique log 
files. 
IV. RESULTS 
The log files gained from the monitoring solution were 
compared with data from the questionnaire participants 
answered.  By comparing these approaches, an understanding 
of user awareness of risky security behaviour can be developed 
i.e. do the log files reflect what users said they actually did in 
the questionnaires?  This multi-modal approach is comparable 
with work by San-José and Rodriguez [16], whereby they 
compared virus scan log data against questionnaire data. 
To produce descriptive statistics from the data gained from 
the log files, databases and questionnaires a binary comparison 
method was required i.e. in the questionnaires, participants 
who answered “yes” in comparison to participants who did not.  
Similarly, when parsing the log files and databases, a 
positive/yes result was searched for e.g. looking for users who 
revealed personal information about themselves in comparison 
to those who did not.  Due to the need for a binary comparison, 
the N-1 Two Proportion Test based upon the N-1 Chi-Square 
test was utilised.  In deriving statistical significance, the alpha 
p-value was set at 0.05 and a two-tailed test was used in a bid 
to detect an effect in either direction.  The main difference 
Table 2  highlights is that when asked if they used a common 
password, participants largely said “no”. However, there is a 
significant statistical difference when the log files are viewed, 
indicating that many users did in fact have common elements 
in their passwords. The same difference is seen across all 
experiments containing affective feedback, suggesting it did 
not have an impact on the actions of users in this instance. 
In terms of revealing personal information, there was a 
significantly higher number of participants who revealed 
personal information about themselves (categorical 
information) in the log files vs. those who reported they 
revealed personal information in the questionnaire in 
experiments groups 1 (control) and 3 (text and avatar-based 
feedback). This potentially highlights a lack of security 
awareness in end users who haven’t realised the level of 
information they divulged. This could also explain the similar 
results for “Did user enter email address?” in groups 4 (text, 
colour-based feedback) and 5 (text, colour, avatar-based 
feedback), and “Did user visit a malicious site?” in groups 1 
(control) and 2 (text-based feedback). 
Table 2. Experimental results- log files vs. questionnaire data 
 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
When the questionnaire results (reported information) were 
compared to the log files (categorical information) there was 
one key question regarding risky security behaviour which 
produced a statistically significant result. 
During the experimental process, when participants were 
asked if they had used a dictionary password, the majority of 
those asked stated “no”. However, after analysing the requisite 
log files, there was a noted statistical significance which 
indicated that the majority of the participants had a common 
element in their password. The same statistical difference is 
noted across all of the experiments which delivered varying 
combinations of affective feedback. 
Question Group 1 
(Control) 
Group 
2 
(Text) 
Group 3 
(Text, 
avatar) 
Group 4 
(Text, 
colour) 
Group 5 
(Text, 
colour, 
avatar) 
User revealed 
personal 
information 
Yes No Yes No No 
User entered 
private email 
address 
No No No Yes Yes 
Entered a 
common 
password 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
User had 
personal 
details in 
password 
No No No No No 
User visited a 
malicious site Yes Yes No No No 
Since similar results are seen across all experiments 
containing affective feedback, it suggests the delivery of the 
affective feedback did not have an overall impact on the 
actions of the participants in this instance, however, there is 
another potential explanation for such a result. 
This result highlights there is still a need to raise security 
awareness in end-users and educate people regarding security 
behaviours which are perceived to be risky [33]. One 
interpretation of the result is that participants may not have 
been aware of the term “dictionary word” in relation to 
passwords. Additionally, they may not have been aware that 
dictionary words in passwords contribute to poor password 
hygiene [10]. 
When participants were asked if they had revealed personal 
information about themselves during the course of the 
experiments, there was a significant difference between those 
who reported revealing information about themselves (as per 
the questionnaire data), in comparison to the number of 
participants who categorically revealed personal information 
about themselves, as revealed by the appropriate log files. 
In experiment 1 (control) and experiment 3 (text and 
avatar-based feedback) there was a significantly higher 
proportion of participants who categorically revealed personal 
information about themselves in the log files, in comparison to 
those who reported they revealed information about themselves 
when answering the questionnaire. Again, this result could be 
explained by the fact participants had a poor understanding of 
risky security behaviour, and perhaps did not understand the 
consequences which could arise from sharing such information. 
A poor understanding of risky security behaviours could 
also explain the similarly statistically significant results gained 
when participants were asked if they entered a private email 
address during the course of the study. Whilst the concept of a 
private email address is purely subjective (what constitutes a 
private email address may differ depending on the user and 
purpose of the address), the log files were simple parsed in an 
effort to determine if the user had provided some form of 
information in the private email address field. Experiment 4 
(text and colour-based feedback) and experiment 5 (text, colour 
and avatar-based feedback) produced statistically significant 
results, with more users revealing email addresses in the log 
files. 
When asking users if they had visited a malicious website 
during the course of the experiment, a statistically significant 
result was gained in experiment 1 (control) and experiment 2 
(text-based feedback). Essentially, more users categorically 
visited malicious sites (according to the log files) than reported 
visiting malicious sites in the questionnaire. Since experiment 1 
does not contain any form of affective feedback whereas 
experiment 2 does, therefore such a result could again be 
attributed to the participant’s lack of security awareness when 
browsing sites online. The proportion of those visiting 
malicious sites in experiment 1 also highlights the requirement 
for a tool to help users- if users are not provided with any 
feedback (like in experiment 1), they will have no way of 
knowing a link they are clicking on is malicious. 
All information provided during the experimental process 
was voluntary, and this statement was clearly displayed at the 
top of the web pages which asked for information such as 
mother’s maiden name, hobbies, email address, etc., which 
again highlights participants either chose to divulge sensitive 
information, or that they actively engaged in risky security 
behaviour by failing to read the page properly. 
There are a number of limitations regarding the study.  In 
relation to the experimental design, end-users were aware they 
were taking part in an experiment therefore, they may have 
assumed all websites they were asked to visit were safe.  
Additionally, the experiments took place on a lab machine 
therefore, participants may have been less careful when 
clicking on links, as they weren't on a personal machine. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Affective feedback did not appear to have an impact on the 
behaviour of users as recorded by categorical information in 
the log files. The majority of results gained were insignificant. 
One anomaly was generated by experiment 5 (text, colour and 
avatar-based feedback) when participants were asked about the 
information they revealed about themselves, in comparison to 
the control log file. This produced a positive result, where 
fewer participants in experiment 5 divulged information and 
this suggests affective feedback may have made a difference.  
However, given that all other results were insignificant, it is 
more plausible that the particular group of participants already 
possessed a good knowledge of risky security behaviours. 
Overall, it has been concluded affective feedback did not have 
an impact on participant behaviour, as per the log files. 
The results gained still highlight an interesting point.  In 
comparing categorical behaviour (log files) and reported 
behaviour (questionnaires), participants were found to have 
engaged in instances of risky security behaviours which they 
were unaware of, and this indicates a generally low level of 
awareness of risky security behaviour. 
This research project involved a small-scale experiment.  
Potentially, if affective feedback was delivered over a longer 
period of time, on a daily basis, the log files could potentially 
reflect positive behavioural changes as end-users become more 
knowledgeable regarding the subject matter.  
VII. FUTURE WORK 
Future work would involve changing some of the affective 
feedback which was delivered to the participants during the 
experiment, and potentially modifying the positioning to find 
the optimal placement.  One possible avenue for further 
research is the impact the gender of the avatar has in terms of 
affect.  Such studies have been explored by Gulz et al. [34] and 
have the potential to be applied to the realm of cyber security.  
Consideration could also be given to the specific phrasing and 
the wordlist used.  There are also a number of other wordlists 
available- running a comparison in terms of risky security 
behaviours could aid in establishing which is the most efficient 
and appropriate list to use when interacting with average end-
users on the internet. 
Results gained may be due to a social desirability response.  
Participants may have answered the questions in a way that 
allows them to be perceived favourably by others.  Potentially, 
this suggests that a study over a longer period, utilising 
affective feedback could slowly raise awareness of risky 
security behaviour in end-users, and the change would 
eventually be reflected in log files. 
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